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Notes
SECONDARY EFFECTS AND POLITICAL SPEECH:
INTIMATIONS OF BROADER GOVERNMENTAL
REGULATORY POWER
I. INTRODUCTION
The first amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
rights of citizens to engage in free speech.' In certain instances, how-
ever, the government may regulate the time, place or manner of the ex-
ercise of that right,2 provided that the regulations "are content-neutral,
are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication."
'3
In Boos v. Barry,4 the United States Supreme Court examined a Dis-
1. The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. One of the seminal cases upholding time, place or manner regulations is
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). Cox applied to parades and other
processions, but the Court has since applied the time, place or manner rationale
in a wide variety of first amendment contexts. For a discussion of Cox, see infra
notes 32-34 and accompanying text, and for a discussion of time, place or man-
ner regulation, see infra notes 27-51 and accompanying text.
3. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2500 (1988) (quoting Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). The major focus
of this Note is whether a given regulation is content-neutral. For a discussion of
this issue, see infra notes 57-64 & 71-92 and accompanying text. The Note will
address only tangentially the other requirements for a time, place or manner
regulation.
4. 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988). For a discussion of Boos, see itfra notes 93-128
and accompanying text.
The petitioners in Boos made a facial challenge to the statute. As such, peti-
tioners did not charge that the statute vested too much discretion in public offi-
cials or that it was uncofnstitutionally vague. See Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104 (1972) (vagueness); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (vague-
ness); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (overbroad discretion); Lovell v. City
of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (overbroad discretion).
In Boos, Justice O'Connor proceeded under a first amendment analysis.
Although some cases involving the content-neutral/content-based distinction
have relied on an equal protection analysis, the Court has stated that a party
"can fare no better under the Equal Protection Clause than under the First
Amendment itself." City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 55
n.4 (1986). See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471-72 (1980) (Stewart, J., con-
curring) (where free speech is issue, first amendment analysis is proper); Stone,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 206
(1983) ("[i]nvocation of the equal protection clause adds nothing constructive to
the analysis"); Westen, The Emptq Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542-50,
560-62 (1982) (use of first amendment renders use of equal protection analysis
"entirely superfluous"). But see Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)
(995)
1
Dugan: Secondary Effects and Political Speech: Intimations of Broader Go
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
trict of Columbia statute 5 which regulated political speech' in public fo-
rums. 7 The Court found the ordinance to be content-based and
eventually invalidated it." However, in the process the Court initiated a
new mode of constitutional analysis. Justice O'Connor's plurality opin-
ion raised the possibility that regulation aimed specifically at political
speech could be constitutional.' AlthoughJustice Brennan concurred in
(claiming to follow equal protection analysis); Farber, Content Regulation and the
First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. LJ. 727, 731-33 (1980) (when differ-
ent protection afforded, equal protection analysis should be used); Karst, Equal-
ity As a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 66-67 (1975)
(four reasons for preferring equal protection analysis: (1) permits protection of
free speech without denigrating justifications for regulation asserted by govern-
ment; (2) emphasizes idea of equality which appeals "to the Court's constituen-
cies, including the public"; (3) forces regulators to decide if regulation
important enough to impose on everyone; and (4) requires meeting compelling
interest test).
5. The District of Columbia statute states:
It shall be unlawful to display any flag, banner, placard, or device
designed or adapted to intimidate, coerce, or bring into public odium
any foreign government, party, or organization, or any officer or of-
ficers thereof ... within five hundred feet of any building or premises
within the District of Columbia used or occupied by any foreign gov-
ernment or its representative . : . or to congregate within five hundred
feet of any such building or premises ....
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1115 (1981).
In Boos, the Court analyzed the first clause, the "display" clause, and the
second clause, the "congregation" clause, separately. This Note concentrates
on the analysis of the "display" clause.
6. The Court has addressed political speech distinctly from other types of
speech. For examplesof "nonpolitical" speech, see City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (adult movie theatres); Heffron v. Interna-
tional Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (religious so-
licitation); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (trial
commentary); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech); New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942) ("fighting words").
7. In asserting that this provision regulated speech in a public forum, Jus-
tice O'Connor invoked the classic formulation ofJustice Roberts: "[T]he title of
streets and parks . . .have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for ... communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions." Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496, 515 (1939).
The Court's analysis in Boos would have been different had the provision
regulated speech in a non-public forum. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46, 49, 55 (1983) (regulation of teachers' mail-
boxes). See generally Post, Between Governance and Management: The Historl, and The-
orv of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987).
8. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1163-64. This holding followed from the Court's find-
ing that the regulation was content-based. Id. at 1164. For a discussion of the
Court's treatment of the regulation in Boos, see infra notes 102-16 and accompa-
nying text.
9. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1162-64. For a discussion ofJustice O'Connor's opin-
ion, see infra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Ste-
996 [Vol. 34 p. 995
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the judgment, he hotly contested such a proposition. It
There are two tests to determine the validity of governmental regu-
lation of speech in a public forum. If a regulation is deemed content-
neutral, then the time, place or manner test I I is employed.' 2 If the reg-
ulation is content-based, then it must serve a compelling governmental
interest, and it must be narrowly drawn to meet that interest.' 3 In Boos,
Justice O'Connor's opinion raised the possibility that the Supreme
Court might hold a regulation aimed at political speech to be content-
neutral.14 This Note further explores that possibility. ' 5
vens and Scalia joined. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1160. Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Marshall, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Id. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White and Blackmun, concurred in part and
dissented in part. Id. Justice Kennedy took no part in the case. Id.
10. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1171-73 (Brennan, J., concurring). For a discussion
of justice Brennan's opinion, see infra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
11. For the elements of the time, place or manner test, see supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2500-01 (1988) (involving
validity of ordinance which regulated picketing of residential dwellings); United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (striking down display statute similar
to one in Boos which applied to area surrounding Supreme Court building);
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (up-
holding school board decision to permit use of interschool mail system by one
school teachers' union but deny it to another).
13. Frisb, 108 S. Ct. at 2500-01; Grace, 461 U.S. at 177; Perry Educ. Ass'n,
460 U.S. at 45.
14. This possibility is significant because content-neutral regulation is
tested under the time, place or manner test. For the elements of this test, see
supra note 3 and accompanying text. The time, place or manner test requires a
significant governmental interest. In contrast, a content-based regulation must
meet a compelling governmental interest. Frisby, 108 S. Ct. at 2500-01; Grace,
461 U.S. at 177; Peny, Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. The difference in these two
tests is crucial. In practice, the Court will almost never find a compelling inter-
est in the first amendment context. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amend-
ment AnalVsis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 144 (1981) (use of compelling standard has
led to erection of "standard incapable of compliance"); Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 53 (1987) (compelling interest standard "al-
most invariably results in invalidation of the challenged restriction"). Only in
the most extreme circumstances will such a compelling interest be acknowl-
edged. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 308
(1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (prevention of political assassination would be
compelling); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (halting publi-
cation of specific troop locations during wartime is compelling).
It is the purpose of this Note to explore the realistic possibility of a politically
content-based regulation meeting the requirements of the first amendment. Vir-
tually no such possibility exists under the compelling interest test. Therefore,
this Note will examine the possibility that a facially politically content-based reg-
ulation can be considered content-neutral and thereby be analyzed under the
time, place or manner test.
15. The possibility has been suggested in other sources. See The Supreme
Court, 1985 Term-Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 198 (1986) [hereinafter
Leading Cases]. At least one interpretation of City of Renton v. Playtime Tlhea-
tres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), is that, given the "Court's willingness to ignore
the facially content-based nature of the ordinance ... and the [purported] im-
3
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This Note will examine case law prior to Boos in order to trace the
support for Justice O'Connor's suggestion that regulations aimed at
political speech might be constitutional. '" This Note will then assess the
likelihood that the Court will accept such a proposition,17 and will in-
quire into the desirability of such regulation.18 Finally, this Note will
suggest an approach which will continue to protect "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open" debate in a public forum,' while simultaneously per-
mitting the government to effect necessary regulation. 20
II. BACKGROUND
Support for Justice O'Connor's suggestion that a politically con-
tent-based regulation could be constitutional stems from a synthesis of
two separate strands of first amendment theory. The first strand, time,
place or manner regulation, 2 1 has a relatively long line of support.2 2 A
regulation passes time, place or manner analysis if, inter alia, it is not
based on the content of what is being regulated.2 3 The second, newer
strand involves regulating the secondary effects of speech. 24 This sec-
ondary effects strand allows a regulation based facially on content, that
is, a regulation which on its face applies to specific types of speech, to be
evaluated as content-neutral if it is not improperly motivated.2 5 If a
facially content-based regulation is viewed as content-neutral on the ba-
sis of the secondary effects theory, it can then be analyzed under the
proper legislative intent behind the ordinance," it may be willing to extend the
secondary effects test beyond sexually explicit speech and into other areas of the
first amendment. Leadintg Cases, supra, at 198. For a discussion of the secondary
effects test, see inJi-a notes 71-92 and accompanying text.
16. See itfra notes 21-92 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the likelihood that a regulation targeted at political
speech might be constitutional, see infra notes 143-69 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the desirability of allowing regulation which affects
political speech, see infra notes 170-209 and accompanying text.
19. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
20. For a discussion of the need for government regulation, see infra notes
34-36 and accompanying text.
21. For the elements of the time, place or manner test, see supra note 3 and
accompanying text. For a broader discussion of the test, see infra notes 27-51
and accompanying text.
22. For a list of cases accepting time, place or manner regulation, see infra
note 30.
23. For a statement of this neutrality requirement, see supra note 3 and ac-
companying text.
24. For a discussion of the secondary effects theory, which advocates inves-
tigation of the government motivation behind a regulation, see infra notes 71-92
and accompanying text.
25. A regulation avoids improper motivation if it is truly aimed at the sec-
ondary effects and not the direct content of the speech being regulated. For a
discussion of the secondary effects theory, see infra notes 7 1-92 and accompany-
ing text.
4
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time, place or manner test.
26
A. Time, Place or Manner Regulation
The "essence of time, place, or manner regulation lies in the recog-
nition that various methods of speech, regardless of their content, may
frustrate legitimate governmental goals."'2 7 The desire to provide for
these legitimate goals without encroaching on the right of free speech
lies at the heart of the time, place or manner standard. In essence, the
standard recognizes a balance between governmental interests and free
speech.
28
A regulation is one of time, place or manner if it is not based upon
content, if it serves a significant governmental interest and if it leaves
open alternative avenues of communication .2 9 In numerous free speech
26. Analysis of a regulation under this test is desirable from the govern-
ment's perspective because the regulation has a much greater chance of being
held valid than if it were deemed to be content-based. For a discussion of the
ability of a regulation to pass different first amendment analyses, see supra note
14.
27. Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980).
For a discussion of Consolidated Edison, see infra note 64.
28. Stone, supra note 4, at 193. By avoiding a highly deferential approach,
the Court does not abandon protection of free speech. At the same time, it
recognizes the need for legitimate regulation. Id.
Professor Stone suggests that the Court evaluates content-neutral regula-
tions on three general levels: (1) deferential review, which entails very little
scrutiny, (2) intermediate review, in which the Court inquires into the govern-
mental need for regulation, and (3) strict review, which is similar to compelling
interest. Stone, supra note 14, at 50-54. The level of review corresponds to the
degree to which the regulation inhibits free speech. Id. at 58. In contrast, re-
view of content-based regulation has only the single standard of compelling in-
terest. Id. at 72-74. By maintaining the three-level review for content-neutral
regulation, the Court need not always defer to the legislature. Id. at 77. At the
same time, the "Court's analysis does not sacrifice legitimate governmental in-
terests when significant first amendment rights are not at issue." Id.
29. See Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2500 (1988). There is an alter-
nate criterion for time, place or manner regulations. Some cases have analyzed
such regulations under the following test:
[G]overnment regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the consti-
tutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or sub-
stantial government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction
on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1967) (draft card burning). See also
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (posting of signs on
public property prohibited).
Professor Day labels this test the "incidental regulation" test. Day, The Inci-
dental Reg-ulation of Free Speech, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 491, 503-05 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Day, Incidental Regulation]. He differentiates the incidental regulation test
from the time, place or manner test. He asserts that the time, place or manner
test applies to regulations whose design and purpose was to effect speech,
whereas the incidental regulation test applies to regulations whose original in-
tent had nothing to do with regulating speech. Id. at 497-99.
1989] NOTE 999
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cases, the Court has upheld this mode of analysis. 30
The seminal case 3 1 upholding time, place or manner regulation is
Cox v. New Hampshire.3 2 In Cox, the Supreme Court upheld a New Hamp-
shire statute which regulated processions in a public street. 3 3 The
Court reasoned that the government had a valid interest in safeguarding
order, and that in preserving that interest, regulations which affected
free expression were proper.3 4 Time, place or manner regulation is the
statutory and judicial recognition that the first amendment does not pro-
vide an individual the opportunity to do whatever he or she wants, at a
time and place of his or her choosing. 35 Rather, government may im-
However, the Court has recognized that the "four-factor standard of United
States v. O'Brien . . . is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time,
place, or manner restrictions." Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984). Professor Day also admits that the Court has recently
blurred the distinction between the two tests. Day, Incidental Regulation, supra, at
495, 518-19, 526; see also Day, The Hybridization of the Content-Neutral Standards for
the Free Speech Clause, 19 ARIz. ST. L.J. 195, 211-20 (1986-1987) [hereinafter Day,
Hybridization] (two tests have now been "hybridized").
Professor Day asserts that this hybridization is improper because both tests
may not be applicable in all cases. Id. at 225-26. He contends that the hybrid-
ized test permits the government to face a lower standard for purposeful regula-
tion of free speech and to do away with the need to prove the regulation was
entirely unrelated to speech, so long as it is supposedly not based on content.
Id. at 220-23.
30. Some of the more recent decisions include Frisby, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (regu-
lation prohibited picketing of residential dwellings); City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (ordinance regulated location of adult movie
theatres); Clark, 468 U.S. 288 (National Park Service rule had de facto effect of
regulating demonstrations in certain national parks); United States v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171 (1983) (statute prohibited display of signs in area surrounding
Supreme Court building); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37 (1983) (school board decision favored ability of one teachers' union
to use interschool mail system over another union).
31. State courts considered time, place or manner regulations as early as
the late 1800s. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court: The
Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
757, 761 n.21 (1986). See, e.g., Frazee's Case, 63 Mich. 396, 30 N.W. 72 (1886)
(court struck down parade licensing statute but suggested that regulations not
concerned with sentiments of movement and based upon time and place would
be acceptable); In re Garrabad, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N.W. 1104 (1893) (though
parade ordinance was invalid for overbroad governmental discretion, under po-
lice power state may enact ordinances which regulate rights, as long as ordi-
nances cannot be susceptible to discriminatory application).
32. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
33. Id. at 570-71. In Cox, the Court upheld the conviction of five Jehovah's
Witnesses. They had violated a state statute by marching without a parade li-
cense. Id. at 570-71. In all, 88 persons marched through the business district of
Manchester, N.H. on a Saturday evening. Though no technical breach of the
peace occurred, sidewalk travel was interrupted. Id. at 572-73.
34. Id. at 574. The Court used as an example the "familiar red traffic
light." It noted that individuals would not be authorized to ignore this regula-
tion, even in exercising their right to free speech. Id. The Court again conjured
up the "familiar red light" in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).
35. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953). Accord Cox, 379
1000 [Vol. 34 p. 995
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pose nondiscriminatory regulations on free speech, so long as the regu-
lations are designed to further "peace, order and tranquility."136
There are a number of public forum cases in which regulations have
passed the time, place or manner test. 37 Two such recent decisions are
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent 38 and Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence.39 In Taxpayers for Vincent, the Court upheld a Los Angeles
ordinance which prohibited the posting of signs on public property.4 0
U.S. at 554. In Poulos, petitioner ignored an ordinance which prohibited reli-
gious meetings in a public park. 345 U.S. at 396-97. Although the Court found
that the ordinance had been unreasonably applied to petitioner, it found that the
ordinance itself was constitutional. It reasoned that "[t]he principles of the First
Amendment are not to be treated as a promise that everyone with opinions or
beliefs to express may gather around him at any time a group for discussion or
instruction." Id. at 405.
36. Poulos, 345 U.S. at 405. To support its contention, the Poulos Court re-
lied on prior decisions. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07
(1940) (government may "regulate the time and manner of solicitation gener-
ally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort or convenience"); Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) ("So long as legislation... does not abridge
the constitutional liberty . . .to impart information through speech . . .it may
lawfully regulate the conduct of those using the streets."); Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496, 516 (1939) (freedom of speech "is not absolute, but relative, and must
be exercised in subordination to the general comfort").
37. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988) (upholding ordinance
which made it unlawful to picket another's residence or dwelling; Court deferred
to district court's finding of content-neutrality and found protection of privacy
of home to be substantial governmental concern); Clark v. Community for Crea-
tive Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding regulation which permitted
other types of demonstrations but prohibited sleeping as form of demonstration
in certain national parks); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789
(1984) (upholding ordinance requiring removal of political campaign posters
from public utility poles); Poulos, 345 U.S. 395 (upholding statute which required
license before any religious services could be held in specific park); Cox, 312 U.S.
569 (upholding license requirement for parade in public street).
38. 466 U.S. 789 (1984). For a further discussion of Tavpayersfor Vincent,
see Comment, Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent: A Step
Backward for Political Campaigning, 17 URB. LAW. 91 (1985) (emphasizing, from
political scientist's point of view, importance of posters in campaign effort);
Note, Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent: The Constitutionality
of Prohibiting Temporar
, 
Sign Posting On Public Property to Advance Local Aesthetic Con-
cerns, 34 DE PAUL L. REV. 197 (1984) ("decision in Vincent demonstrates a sur-
prising insensitivity to the first amendment's protection of free speech in the
face of subjective aesthetic regulation").
39. 468 U.S. 288 (1984). For a further discussion of Comninityfor Creative
Aon-Violence, see Note, Caniping On First Aiendmient Rights, 22 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 567, 574 (1987) ("Court devalued political speech to the level where some-
thing as nebulous as aesthetics could regulate it"); Case Comment, NVational Park
Service Regulations Prohibiting "Camping" As Applied to Demonstrators, Who Wish to
Sleep in Public Parks, Does Not Violate First Aieniduieit Rights, 10 T. MARSHALL L.J.
677 (1985) (discussing sleep as speech and application of time, place or manner
test); Note, Regulation Prohibiting Sleepiiig in .ational Parks Upheld As a Valid Time,
Place, aid Mlanner Regulation Regardless of ll'hether Sleeping Is Speech, 15 U. BAI.T. L.
REV. 181 (1985) (discussing sleep as speech and proper standard for determin-
ing whether regulation furthers substantial governmental interest).
40. Taxpayersfor Vincent, 466 U.S. at 803-17. Roland Vincent was running
1989] NOTE 1001
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Recognizing that "the state may sometimes curtail speech when neces-
sary to advance a significant and legitimate state interest, '4 1 the Court
applied the time, place or manner test.4 2 The Court first found the ordi-
nance to be content-neutral. It stated that nothing in the text of the
ordinance suggested a bias against a particular view, and that the ordi-
nance had been applied in an even-handed manner.4 3 The city justified
the ordinance by pointing to the deleterious effects such signs had on
community aesthetics. The Court found this concern to be a legitimate
interest. 44 Moreover, the Court held that the ordinance was narrowly
drawn because it affected only signs which were the cause of the con-
cern.4 5 Finally, the Court asserted that ample alternative means of com-
munication remained. Individuals could, for example, post signs on
private property, verbalize their beliefs or distribute handbills. 46
Similarly, in Community for Creative Non-Violence, the Court upheld a
time, place or manner regulation. 4 7 The decision sustained a National
for the Los Angeles City Council. His campaign had signs which read "Roland
Vincent-City Council" placed over utility pole crosswires. Id. at 792-93. A city
ordinance prohibited such posting and city employees removed the signs. Id.
Vincent's supporters and the company which posted the signs brought suit in
federal court to enjoin removal of the signs. Id. at 793.
41. Id. at 804.
42. The Court applied the test devised in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1967). Taxpayersfor Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804-05. Fora discussion of the
O'Brien test and its similarity to the time, place or manner test, see supra note 29.
43. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804. Because the district court found
that both political and non-political signs had been removed "without regard to
their content," and the Court found the ordinance neutral on its face, the ordi-
nance met the neutrality requirement of the time, place or manner test. Id. at
794, 804.
44. Id. at 805-07. Other decisions have also held that aesthetic concerns
are a legitimate governmental interest. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Di-
ego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). In Aletrornedia, a San Diego ordinance banned certain
types of outdoor advertising billboards. 1(. at 493-96. The ordinance was justi-
fied in part by a desire to beautify and maintain the appearance of the city. Id. at
493. Although the Court was deeply divided as to the constitutionality of the
ordinance, at least seven of the nine Justices recognized San Diego's aesthetic
concerns as legitimate. Id. at 507-08 (White,J., plurality opinion), 552 (Stevens,
J., dissenting in part), 560 (Burger, CJ., dissenting), 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). For a further discussion of l'etromedia, see Note, Billboard Blight. Is the Aes-
thetic Quality of 1'erniont ' Landscape in Jeopardy After Aletroniedia?, 9 VT. L. REv. 341
(1984).
45. Taxpayers for l'incent, 466 U.S. at 808-10. The Court found that "the City
did no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy." Id.
at 808. Therefore, the ordinance met the narrowly tailored requirement. The
Court held that if the mode of speech itself created the perceived evil, then the
city could prohibit that method of communication. Id. at 810.
46. Id. at 811, 812.
47. 468 U.S. 288 (1984). The Community for Creative Non-Violence
(CCNV) staged demonstrations in Lafayette Park and on the Mall in Washing-
ton, D.C. The demonstrators sought to bring attention to the plight of the
homeless. Id. at 289. For that reason, CCNV sought permission to have the
homeless actually inhabit the parks as part of the demonstration. Id. at 291-92.
1002 [Vol. 34 p. 995
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Park Service rule which prohibited camping in certain parks. 48 The
Court found that because the prohibition was not grounded in disagree-
ment with the campers' views, it was content-neutral. 4 9 Further, the
Court found that the government had a substantial interest in the pres-
ervation of national parks. This interest was narrowly served by a ban
on camping which prevented the wear and tear attendant to such activ-
ity. 50 Moreover, individuals were not prohibited from demonstrating in
the parks, only from camping in them. 5 1 Alternative methods of com-
munication thus remained open. As with other time, place or manner
regulations, the government achieved needed regulation while free
speech rights were preserved.
B. Secondary Effects
The second necessary strand for Justice O'Connor's opinion in Boos
was the secondary effects doctrine. The secondary effects doctrine first
received full support from the Court in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc.5 2 This doctrine provides that a facially content-based regulation
may be construed as content-neutral if it is targeted at the secondary
effects of the regulated speech. 5 - However, controversy exists over
whether content-based regulation can ever be valid.5 4 Supreme Court
cases have been far from consistent. Some have purported to forbid any
When the National Park Service refused permission, CCNV filed an action in
federal court.
48. Id. at 290-91. The rule defined camping in part as sleeping, preparing
accommodations to sleep or otherwise using the park as a place in which to live.
36 C.F.R. § 50.27(a) (1983).
49. Communin, for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 295.
50. The demonstrators noted that they were not prohibited from con-
ducting a 24-hour vigil in the parks, but merely from sleeping in them. There-
fore, they asserted that the act of sleeping would impose only marginally more
strain on the parks. Id. at 296. The Court disagreed. Id. The Court reasoned
that if the homeless were not permitted to inhabit the parks, fewer of them
would join the demonstration, and there would be a corresponding easing of the
wear and tear on the parks. Id. The Court also stated that if the demonstrators
in the case before it were permitted to sleep in the parks, there would be nothing
to stop demonstrators in future cases from claiming a right to sleep in the parks.
Id. at 296-97.
Finally, the Court stated that simply because other methods existed to re-
duce wear and tear on the parks, such as limiting the size, duration or frequency
of demonstrations, this did not mean that the current regulation was not nar-
rowly tailored. Id. at 299. The Court pointed out that it was up to the Service
and not the judiciary to determine the best method of managing the national
park system. Id.
51. Id. at 295.
52. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). For a discussion of Renton, see infra notes 84-92
and accompanying text.
53. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-49.
54. For a discussion of the argument against secondary effects regulation,
see infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
1989] 1003NOTE
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regulation based on content, 55 while others have upheld such regula-
tions.Sb Therefore, any attempt to apply a secondary effects analysis
must first dispense with the claim that content-based regulation is neces-
sarily invalid.
1. Content-Based Regulation
The argument against facially content-based regulation had its gen-
esis and maintains its roots in Police Department v. Mosely. 57 In Mosely, the
defendant, a school custodian, wished to picket the local high school to
55. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (public university may
not deny use of school facilities to student religious group while permitting
other groups such use); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490
(1981) (plurality decision) (city may not permit some commercial billboard ad-
vertising but prohibit all non-commercial advertising); Consolidated Edison v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (Commission may not allow certain
types of information to be mailed with customer's bill, but prohibit mailings on
controversial topics); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (ordinance which
prohibited picketing but contained exception for labor picketing held invalid);
Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (ordinance aimed at drive-
in theatre showing films containing nudity held invalid).
56. Decisions which permit content-based regulation include Renton, 475
U.S. 41 (ordinance which treated adult motion picture theatres differently than
other movie houses); FCC v. Pacific Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (FCC may reg-
ulate radio program containing sexually explicit speech); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (city may discriminate between adult motion
picture theatres and other movie houses); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)
(political speech may be banned from military base, even where other speech
permitted); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (political
advertising on public transportation banned, while other advertising permitted);
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Assoc. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548 (1973) (public employers may not express opinion on public affairs if such
expression is directed towards party success); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (networks may sell time to com-
mercial advertisers but decide not to sell time to public issue groups).
57. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). While loselv was the first Supreme Court case to
purportedly prohibit all types of content-based discrimination, Alosel, drew heav-
ily from Justice Black's concurring opinion in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
580-81 (1964) (Black, J., concurring). See Stephan, The First Amendment and Con-
tent Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 218-27 (1982).
In Cox, approximately 2000 black students involved in civil rights protesting
congregated on the sidewalk near a courthouse in Baton Rouge. 379 U.S. at
538-43. One of the leaders of the protest, a Congregationalist minister, was
arrested on a number of different counts, among them obstructing public pas-
sageways. Id. at 537-38. The majority reversed the conviction on this count,
finding the statute to have been applied in a discriminatory manner. Id. at 555-
58. Justice Black also believed the conviction should be reversed, but he rested
his decision on other grounds.
Justice Black believed the statute to be facially invalid. While the statute
prohibited the obstruction of public streets and sidewalks, it provided an excep-
tion for labor unions protesting unfair labor practices. Id. at 580 (Black,J., con-
curring). Justice Black maintained that distinctions based on subject matter
permitted the government to "pick and choose among the views it is willing to
have discussed on its streets." Id. at 581 (Black, J., concurring). He fotnd such
a practice to be "censorship in a most odious form." Id. (Black, J., concurring).
1004
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protest what he believed to be racial discrimination. 58 A city ordinance
prohibited picketing in front of any school, unless the picketing involved
a labor dispute with the school.
59
The Court noted the differing treatment accorded peaceful labor
speech and other types of speech. Relying on Justice Black's concurring
opinion in Cox v. Louisiana,60 the Court found the ordinance unconstitu-
tional."' The Court held that "above all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. ' ' 62 Because the
regulation before the Court had attempted to censor speech "in terms
of subject matter... [t]he regulation 'thus slip[ped] from the neutrality
of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about content.' This is
58. Moslev, 408 U.S. at 93. For seven months prior to the enactment of a
regulation which prohibited such picketing, Earl Mosely had quietly patrolled
the sidewalk in front of Jones Commercial High School carrying a sign which
read "Jones High School practices black discrimination. Jones High School has
a black quota." Id.
59. Id. at 92-93. The district court granted a directed verdict for the gov-
ernment. Id. at 94. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that the ordi-
nance was overly broad. Id. The Supreme Court did not base its decision on
this overbroadness, relying instead on the content-based nature of the ordi-
nance. Id.
60. Id. at 97-98 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 581 (Black, J., concur-
ring)). For a discussion of Justice Black's concurrence, see supra note 57. Pro-
fessor Stephan notes that Justice Black actually offered three reasons for
invalidating the statute. First, by singling out labor-related speech for special
treatment, "Louisiana had 'attempted to pick and choose among the views it
[was] willing to have discussed on its streets.' " Stephan, supra note 57, at 220
(quoting Cox, 379 U.S. at 581 (Black, J., concurring)). Second, Justice Black
stated that Louisiana "had employed racial criteria to select disfavored views."
Id. Third, Justice Black found that the state had employed the regulation in a
discriminatory manner because groups other than labor unions had been per-
mitted to block public streets. Id.
61. Aloslev, 408 U.S. at 94-102. The Court repeatedly stated that regula-
tions based on content are per se invalid. Id. at 94, 95, 96, 99. Nonetheless,
after finding that the anti-picketing ordinance was content-based, the Court ana-
lyzed the ordinance to see if it was narrowly tailored to meet a substantial gov-
ernmental interest. Id. at 98-99, 100-01. Commentators have expressed
concern with this anomaly in the Court's opinion. See Stephan, supra note 57, at
224 (Court's development of proper standard "unsatisfactory"). If the Court
had been following its newly promulgated per se rule, there would have been no
need for an investigation into the governmental interest. Id. Moselyv is cited for
the proposition that ordinances based on content are absolutely impermissible.
Yet the Aloselv Court's governmental interest analysis may have been an admis-
sion that its content rule was unworkable, even as that rule was being stated.
Thus, an argument can be made that the Court's content-based declaration was
simply dicta. For a discussion of the contention that a per se rule is unworkable,
see itfra notes 131-41 and accompanying text.
62. Moselv, 408 U.S. at 95. While these first two prohibitions were "well
established in the caselaw and [were] whollyjustifiablefJ the other [two were]
entirely new and ... indefensible." Stephan, supra note 57, at 203-04. In reach-
ing its decision, the Mosely Court failed to reconcile its holding with prior deci-
sions which had permitted regulations based on content. Id. at 227.
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never permitted."' 63 The rationale behind Mosely is that "[t]o allow a
government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would
be to allow that government control over the search for political
truth."
64
Although Mosely stated that regulations based on content are never
permitted, the Court has not consistently applied this rule. 65 Indeed,
many regulations based on content have survived constitutional scru-
tiny.6" Even in those decisions which struck down such regulations, the
concurring and dissenting opinions continued to support the validity of
content-based regulation.6 7 Moreover, Mosely itself and cases which
63. Mosely, 408 U.S. at 99 (quoting Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum:
Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 29). This prohibition has been fleshed
out in later cases so that "[t]he First Amendment's hostility to content-based
regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to
prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic." Consolidated Edison v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980). Accord Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct.
1157, 1163 (1988); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 n.6 (1980).
64. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 538. Accord Carey, 447 U.S. at 468 ("the
desire to favor one form of speech over all others-is illegitimate").
Both Consolidated Edison and Carey are paradigmatic Mosely cases. In Consoli-
dated Edison, Consolidated Edison wished to place information in its billing enve-
lopes praising nuclear energy. 447 U.S. at 532. The National Resources
Defense Council requested permission from the New York Public Service Com-
mission (Commission) to enclose a rebuttal in the next billing. Id. The Com-
mission resolved the problem by banning any information on topics of public
controversy, although it continued to permit information concerning non-con-
troversial issues. Id. at 532-33. The Court held this to be a regulation based on
the controversial content of the speech and invalidated the Commission's ruling.
Id. at 535-44. For a further discussion of Consolidated Edison, see Note, Billing
Inserts: A Unique Forum for Free Speech-Consolidated Edison Company v. Public
Service Commission, 30 DE PAUL L. REV. 705 (1981).
Carey, is based on facts similar to Mosely. In Carey, an Illinois statute banned
picketing of residential dwellings, but it granted an exception for labor disputes
if the dwelling housed a business. 447 U.S. at 457. The statute was found to be
content-based because the legality of picketing depended solely on the message
which the picketers wished to convey. Id. at 459-63.
65. See Farber, supra note 4, at 727-28 (Moslev's content-neutrality principle
"has not been followed with much consistency"); Stephan, supra note 57, at 205
("[d]espite its repeated invocations of a near-absolute content neutrality rule,
the Court has not followed its own precept"); Stone, supra note 4, at 240-41
(confusion over subject-matter restrictions has led to "inconsistency in [Court's]
analysis"); Note, Content Regulation and the Dimensions of Free Expression, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1854, 1855 (1983) ("Court has remained deeply divided over the issue
of content discrimination, and has issued a number of badly fragmented and
inconsistent decisions").
66. For a list of decisions upholding content-based regulations, see supra
note 56.
67. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(in their educational mission, state universities can, must and do make decisions
based on content); Carey,, 447 U.S. at 483 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[c]ontent
regulation, when closely related to a permissible state purpose, is clearly permit-
ted"); .losely, 408 U.S. at 102-03 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (Mosely should not be
read to say government can never regulate content); Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 787-90 (1976)
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have purported to follow its reasoning still scrutinized governmental
ends and means rather than automatically invalidating content-based
regulations, 68 and practical and theoretical considerations counsel
against strict application of the Mosely rule.6' 9 While Mosely remains the-
oretically viable, the Court has retreated from its proclamation that all
regulation facially based on content is invalid. 7 °
2. Emergence of Secondary Effects Analysis
Renton was the first case in which a majority of the Court utilized the
secondary effects theory. Justice O'Connor relied heavily on Renton to
support her secondary effects analysis in Boos;7 1 Renton, in turn, had re-
lied on the plurality opinion in Young v. American Mini Theatres 72 and the
motivation test which it embraced. 73
In American Mini Theatres, the city of Detroit had enacted an ordi-
nance which restricted the location of adult movie houses. 74 Because
the ordinance was based on the content of material shown in such movie
houses, it was facially content-based. 75 The restrictions were justified
on the ground that the adult theatres adversely impacted the surround-
ing area. 76
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing against protection of commercial speech
under first amendment).
68. See supra note 61; see also lidmar, 454 U.S. at 276 (when dealing with
ordinance which regulates based on content, Court must examine it with "most
exacting scrutiny"-rather than automatically invalidating such regulation). Ac-
cord Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 536; Care,, 447 U.S. at 465.
69. For a discussion of the practical and theoretical difficulties with apply-
ing the 1losely test, see infra notes 131-41 and accompanying text.
70. For a discussion regarding the viability of Moselv, see infra note 132.
71. For a discussion of Justice O'Connor's use of the Renton secondary ef-
fects analysis in Boos, see infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
72. 427 U.S. 50 (1976); see Renton, 475 U.S. at 46.
73. At least in Renton, the essence of the Court's test was governmental mo-
tivation. Note, Motivational Analvsis in Light of Renton, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 344,
348 (1987) ("Court made its determination of content neutrality contingent on a
finding of permissible government motivation"). Assessing motivation involves
determining whether the government's purpose in regulating was to suppress
the content of certain speech.
74. 427 U.S. at 52. Under the ordinance, adult movie houses could not
operate within 1000 feet of any two other regulated uses (regulated uses in-
cluded other adult theatres, bars, pawnshops and pool halls). Id. Also, adult
movie houses could not operate within 500 feet of a residential area. Id.
75. Id. at 53. The Court stated that "[t]he classification of a theater as
'adult' is expressly predicated on the character of the motion pictures which it
exhibits." Id.
76. Id. at 54 n.6, 54-55. The regulations were amendments to a Detroit
"Anti-Skid Row Ordinance." Id. at 54. Detroit was attempting to upgrade por-
tions of the city, and it sought to do so through regulation of certain businesses,
including adult movie theatres. The city had found, with the aid of urban plan-
ning and real estate experts, that "the location of several such businesses in the
same neighborhood tends to attract an undesirable quantity and quality of tran-
sients, adversely affects property values, causes an increase in crime, especially
1989] NOTE 1007
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The American Mini Theatres plurality began its analysis by asserting
that the ordinance would be found to be a valid time, place or manner
regulation if the classification of the theatres based on the content of the
movies they showed was valid. 77 The plurality rejected a pure Mosely
analysis. Instead, it found, by referring to prior case law, that a regula-
tion was not necessarily invalid because it was based on content.78 The
plurality then explored the meaning of content-neutrality. It held that
"the essence [of the rule requiring content-neutrality] is the need for
absolute neutrality by the government; its regulation of communication
may not be affected by sympathy or hostility for the point of view being
expressed by the communicator. ' ' 79 In dicta, the Court indicated that
this reading of the neutrality requirement might also be appropriate for
regulations involving political speech in a public forum.8,
Thus the Court adopted the motivation test,"' by which a content-
based regulation could be interpreted as content-neutral. Under this
test the government may regulate the time, place or manner of expres-
prostitution, and encourages residents and businesses to move elsewhere." Id.
at 55.
77. Id. at 62-63. In other words, the Court initially found that absent the
different treatment accorded adult theatres, the regulation was a proper time,
place or manner regulation. The Court then determined whether such different
treatment was also proper.
78. Id. at 65-66. Because the ordinance was content-based, the Court was
forced to decide whether Moselv had properly laid down an absolute prohibition
against content regulation. Id. at 53. In order to find the ordinance constitu-
tional the Court had to find illosely overstated. It did so. Id. at 65-66.
To support its finding, the Court noted several cases analyzing regulations
based on content. Id. at 66-70. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech re-
ceives less protection than, for example, "political commentary"); Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (upholding ordinance that prohib-
ited political advertising but permitted commercial advertising on public trans-
portation); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upheld law which
prohibited selling material to minors which would be obscene to minors but not
to adults); see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (different
standard of libel required if public official is subject of expression).
79. Amencan Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 67.
80. The Court stated:
[Tihe use of streets and parks for the free expression of news on na-
tional affairs may not be conditioned upon the sovereign's agreement
with what a speaker may intend to say .... The sovereign's agreement
or disagreement with the content of what a speaker has to say may not
affect the regulation of the time, place, or manner of presenting the
speech.
Id. at 63-64.
Although American! Mini Theatres did not involve a public forum, by speaking
of "streets and parks" the Court in dicta extended the use of the motivation test
to such public forums. Moreover, while adult theatres generally do not dissemi-
nate political speech, by extending the motivation test to "views on national af-
fairs" the Court may have implicated political speech.
81. The terms "motivation test" and "secondary effects test" are used in-
terchangeably throughout this Note.
1008 [Vol. 34 p. 995
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sion, and may single out expression based on content, so long as it does
so neutrally. The government regulates neutrally when it regulates free
of any sympathy or hostility for the speaker's point of view.8 '2 Because
Detroit regulated in response to the deterioration of areas surrounding
adult movie houses, and without regard to the content of the movies
shown in them, the regulation in American Mini Theatres was neutral and
met the time, place or manner requirements.8 3
Renton is similar to American Mini Theatres in that it upheld facially
content-based restrictions on adult movie houses.8 4 The Renton ordi-
nance prohibited such movie houses near residential zones, churches,
parks and schools.8 5 The ordinance stated that it was designed to
"protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of ... urban life,"'8"1 and the district
court found this was indeed the "predominant concern[]" of the
ordinance.8
7
The Court stated that if a regulation is targeted at the secondary
effects of speech, then even if it classifies and regulates based upon con-
tent, it is not content-based.8 8 The Court stated that the "fundamental
principle that underlies our concern about 'content-based' speech regu-
82. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 63-70. The concurrence similarly
suggested that as long as a message does not depend on where or how it is
presented for its impact, then the regulation of place, even if it singles out
speech based on its content, is permissible because it "does not interfere with
content." Id. at 78-79 (Powell, J., concurring).
The dissent, on the other hand, relied on Mosely in asserting that the ordi-
nance was unconstitutional. Id. at 84-85 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissent
argued that selective restrictions based on content are unconstitutional, and
concluded that it could "only interpret [the Court's] decision as an aberration."
Id. at 87 (Stewart, J., dissenting). It was not an aberration, however, for the
Court used similar analysis in Rentoi and Boos.
83. Id. at 62-71. The Court deferred to the city's claim that the separation
of adult theatres would serve the "serious" government concern of preserving
neighborhood character. Id. at 71. The Court also noted that adult theatres had
not been prohibited, simply dispersed, so that opportunity for speech remained
open. Id. at 62. Therefore, the Court concluded that if the government could
properly regulate theatres based on the content of films shown in them, the reg-
ulation would be a valid time, place or manner regulation. Id. at 63. The Court
determined that because the government's singling out of adult movie theatres
was not predicated on dislike for the content of movies shown in them, such
classification was permissible. Id. at 63-70. As a result, the regulations were
held to be valid.
84. Renton, 475 U.S. at 43, 44, 45.
85. Id. at 43.
86. Id. at 48. Although no adult theatres existed in Renton at the time the
regulation was proposed, within a year of the regulation's enactment, two such
theatres attempted to locate in the town. Id. at 44-45. The Court found that the
town's interest in controlling these establishments was a substantial governmen-
tal interest. Id. at 50.
87. Id. at 47 (emphasis in Supreme Court's opinion). The Court held that
as long as the predominate concern of the legislative body was properly moti-
vated, the ordinance could be constitutional. Id. at 47-48.
88. Id. at 47-49.
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lations" is that the government not be motivated by disagreement with
the speaker.8 9 The Renton ordinance was justified by reference to sec-
ondary effects 90 and was therefore effectively content-neutral. The
Court stated that this analysis was "completely consistent with [its] defi-
nition of 'content-neutral' speech regulations as those that 'are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech.' ", As a re-
sult, ordinances which strike at "undesirable secondary effects ... are to
be reviewed under the standards applicable to 'content-neutral' time,
place, and manner regulations. "92
C. The Case: Boos v. Barry
In Boos v. Barry, the petitioner wished to display signs in front of the
Soviet and Nicaraguan embassies which were critical of the governments
of those two countries. 93 Such speech was political in nature, as it re-
lated to the conduct of governments. A District of Columbia statute
89. Id. at 48-49. The Court traced this reasoning back to Mosely, which
stated in part that the " 'government may not grant the use of a forum to people
whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less
favored or more controversial views.' " Id. at 48-49 (quoting Mosely, 408 U.S. at
96).
90. "The ordinance by its terms is designed to prevent crime, protect the
city's retail trade, maintain property values, and generally 'protec[t] and
preserv[e] the quality of [the city's] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and
the quality of urban life,' not to suppress the expression of unpopular views."
Id. at 48 (quoting App. to Juris. statement 90a).
One test for secondary effects regulation as found in Renton is as follows:
[W]hether the harm that the state is seeking to avert is one that grows
out of the fact that the defendant is communicating, and more particu-
larly out of the way people can be expected to react to his message, or
rather would arise even if the defendant's conduct had no communica-
tive significance whatever.
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1497 (1975).
91. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (emphasis added) (quoting Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
The dissenting opinion rejected this definition of neutrality. Id. at 55-56 (Bren-
nanJ., dissenting). It reasoned that when speech was restricted on the basis of
content, the regulation was content-based and should be invalidated under Con-
solidated Edison v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), and Mosely.
Renton, 475 U.S. at 56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. Renton, 475 U.S. at 49. The Court found the Renton ordinance to be
content-neutral. Id. at 48. The Court then applied the time, place or manner
test. It found that the preservation of the "quality of urban life" was a substan-
tial government interest, and that alternative avenues of communication re-
mained, for 520 acres, or over five percent of the land in Renton, was unaffected
by the ordinance. Id. at 50-54.
93. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1161. Father R. David Finzer and several other mem-
bers of the Young Conservative Alliance of America wished to carry signs critical
of the Soviet and Nicaraguan governments in front of their embassies. Finzer v.
Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nora.
Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988). The signs in front of the Soviet embassy
would read "RELEASE SAKHAROV" and "SOLIDARITY," and the sign in
1010 [Vol. 34 p. 995
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prohibited petitioners from displaying their signs within five hundred
feet of the targeted embassies. The statute barred the display of any
sign within the proscribed area which might bring that foreign govern-
ment into "public odium" or "public disrepute. 19 4
The district court granted the District of Columbia's motion for
summary judgment. 5 The court of appeals affirmed.9 " The court of
appeals ruled that because the statute was content-based it had to meet
the compelling state interest test.91 7 The court then found such a com-
pelling interest. It held that the United States' obligations under inter-
national law and concern for American diplomats abroad were interests
so compelling that they justified the interference with free speech.)1 In
addition, the court found the statute to be narrowly drawn because it
prohibited offensive demonstrations only within a very limited area.''
The court also intimated that the statute might be recognized as con-
tent-neutral under the secondary effects test. The court observed that
the statute was "justified by reference to content-neutral values-the
need to adhere to principles of international law and to provide suffi-
cient protection to foreign embassies," not by any desire to stifle the
content of the speech. ° ° Although the court eventually based its hold-
front of the Nicaraguan embassy would read "STOP THE KILLING." Boos, 108
S. Ct. at 1161.
94. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1160. For the text of this statute, see supra note 5.
The statute also outlawed the congregation of three or more people within 500
feet of a foreign embassy. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1160. The Court found the congre-
gation clause to be constitutional. For a discussion of the Court's treatment of
the congregation clause, see infra note 116.
95. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1161.
96. Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1453.
97. Id. at 1468. In finding the compelling interest test proper, the court
rejected petitioners' claim that Alosely placed an absolute ban on any content-
based regulation. Id.
98. Id. at 1455-58, 1460-61. The court stated that under international law,
"security for the persons and respect for the dignity and peace of foreign emis-
saries[] has been regarded as a fundamental and compelling national interest."
Id. at 1458. The court found this interest in documents such as the 1961 Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which states that " '[tihe receiving State is
under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission... and
to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.' " Id. at
1457 (quoting the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961,
art. 22, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95) (emphasis added by
the court).
The court of appeals found further support for a compelling interest in the
"existence of a direct relationship between the perception held by other govern-
ments of the strength of security provided their diplomats here and the extent of
protection they choose to provide ours." Id. at 1460.
For a further discussion of the compelling interests derived from interna-
tional law concerns, see Recent Developments, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 399, 412-28
(1987) (finding statute in Boos unconstitutional because dignity interest of for-
eign diplomats uncompelling).
99. Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1462-63.
100. Id. at 1469 n.15. The court thus alluded to the secondary effects anal-
19891 NOTE 1011
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ing on what it perceived to be the firmer ground of a compelling state
interest,I" it had at least suggested that the statute might be content-
neutral.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision below which had upheld
the display clause. 1° 2 The Court also found the clause to be content-
based regulation. 103 Significantly, however, Justice O'Connor's finding
that the regulation was content-based did not rest on the conclusion that
it was targeted solely at speech critical of foreign governments. 104
Rather, Justice O'Connor chose to apply the Renton secondary effects
analysis. 105
Justice O'Connor stated that regulations which "are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech" are content-neu-
tral. lo( She then examined the government's motivation for restricting
the politically critical speech. The inquiry under the secondary effects
test was whether the government was concerned with stopping the sub-
stantive content of the speech or merely the secondary effects which
would follow from such speech. 10 7 Justice O'Connor held that the justi-
fication for the Boos regulation did not fit within the meaning of "secon-
dary effects" as defined in Renton. I"
Justice O'Connor stated that "[r]egulations that focus on the direct
impact of speech on its audience ... are not the type of 'secondary ef-
fects' [regulations] we referred to in Renton."-lO The District of Colum-
ysis used in Renton and American Mini Theatres. For a discussion of this analysis,
see supra notes 71-92 and accompanying text.
101. Finzer, 798 F.2d at 1469 n. 15. The court was not certain that the Ren-
ton test would apply to the statute before it, so it relied instead on its finding of a
compelling state interest to affirm the regulation. Id.
102. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1162.
103. Id. at 1162-64.
104. This approach would have mirrored the Mosely approach, for as soon
as the regulation focused on a particular type of speech, it would have been
found to be content-based. See Police Dept. v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
Under Moselv, such content-based regulations are supposedly per se invalid.
105. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1163-64. Significantly, there was no need to use the
Renton analysis to find the regulation content-based ifJustice O'Connor had de-
sired to invoke the per se approach of Mosely. See id. at 1173 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
106. Id. at 1163 (emphasis in original) (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). Justice
O'Connor further stated that "[s]o long as the justifications for regulation have
nothing to do with content . . . we conclude[] that the regulation [is] properly
analyzed as content-neutral." Id.
107. Id. at 1163-64.
108. Id. at 1163.
109. Id. For example, if instead of targeting the increased crime, loss of
property values and deterioration of the residential character of neighborhoods
associated with adult movie theatres, Renton had focused on the psychological
effect of adult films on those who watched them, that regulation would have
been content-based. Id. For a discussion of Renton, see supra notes 84-92 and
accompanying text.
1012
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 5 [1989], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss5/9
1989] NOTE 1013
bia defended the display clause solely on the need to protect the dignity
of foreign officials by screening them from speech critical of their gov-
ernments. I I1 Therefore, the clause was aimed at the "direct impact" of
the speech. As a result, it was 'justified only by reference to the content
of speech," and was therefore content-based.I I I
Because the regulation was content-based, Justice O'Connor ap-
plied the compelling state interest test.' 1 2 Although the Court acqui-
esced in assuming, though not deciding, that the protection of foreign
diplomats was a compelling interest, it found the regulation was "not
narrowly tailored to serve that interest."' 13 It found that a similar fed-
eral statute with identical goals, which applied everywhere outside the
District of Columbia, effectively employed less restrictive means to pro-
tect foreign diplomats.' 14
In addition, after the court of appeals had handed down its decision
the District of Columbia repealed the statute in Boos, contingent upon
the extension of the less restrictive federal statute to the District.' '
Therefore, because the display clause was content-based regulation
which was not narrowly tailored to meet the government's putative in-
terest, the Court invalidated the clause. l16
Justice Brennan wrote separately to express his concern with the
Renton motivation test.' 17 Justice Brennan was concerned not only that
a content-based restriction might be held to be content-neutral, but also
110. Boos, 108 S. Ct. 1164.
111. Id. (emphasis in original).
112. For the elements of the compelling state interest test, see supra note 13
and accompanying text.
113. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1165.
114. Id. at 1165-67. The more narrow statute prohibited willful attempts to
intimidate or harass foreign officials. However, it did not necessarily ban picket-
ing or the display of signs, nor was it directed specifically at the content of
speech. Id. at 1166.
115. Id. at 1167-68. It appeared to the Court that because the government
now considered the more narrow regulation adequate to protect foreign diplo-
mats, the claim that the display clause was narrowly tailored was untenable. Id.
at 1168.
116. Id. at 1162. The Court, however, affirmed the constitutionality of the
congregation clause as construed by the court of appeals. Id. at 1168-69. The
Court upheld the court of appeals' narrowing construction which limited the
congregation clause's reach to those demonstrations directed specifically at an
embassy and posing a physical security threat to it. Id. Moreover, the Court
found that the statute as a whole did not present an equal protection problem,
even though it provided an exception for labor picketing. Id. at 1170. Because
the Court had already invalidated the display clause, it posed no further consti-
tutional problem to the rest of the statute. The congregation clause as narrowed
protected only peaceful labor picketing. Id. The Court thought it unreasonable
to suggest that the labor exception could protect violent labor picketing. Id.
117. Id. at 1171-73 (Brennan, J., concurring). While Justice Brennan
agreed that the display clause should be invalidated, he objected to Justice
O'Connor's reasoning.
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that the Renton test might be held to apply even to political speech. IIs
Justice Brennan stated that a practical flaw in applying the Renton
test was the difficulty of determining legislative motive. I I' His primary
concern, however, was the government's apparent ability under the mo-
tivation test to censor political speech whenever it could "concoct 'sec-
ondary' rationalizations for regulating the content of [such] speech."120
Although the statute in Boos was found to be content-based because it
was justified by a dignity concern, Justice Brennan asserted that in the
future, the government was not likely "to be so bold or so forthright" as
to assert a similar content-based interest.' 2 1 Rather, he asserted, the
government could be expected to provide some secondary effects ra-
tionalization for its speech restriction.' 2 2 Justice Brennan stated that
the secondary effects test therefore "offer[s] countless excuses for con-
tent-based suppression of political speech."' 123 At bottom the most
troublesome point for Justice Brennan was that he found it difficult to
believe that a regulation content-based on its face was not also content-
based at heart.' 24
What made the Boos regulation all the more worrisome to Justice
Brennan was that it applied to political speech. Even if the Court could
determine that a legislature was motivated by a concern with secondary
effects, Justice Brennan asserted that a facially content-based regulation
was still problematic. He claimed that such regulation would subvert
the right of speakers to unfettered speech and the right of listeners to
undistorted debate. 12 5 He stated that "[t]hese rights are all the more
precious when the speech subject to unequal treatment is political
speech and the debate being distorted is political debate." 1 26 Justice
118. Id. at 1171 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan lamented
"[u]ntil today, the Renton analysis, however unwise, had at least never been ap-
plied to political speech." Id. at 1172 (Brennan, J., concurring).
119. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan agreed that an exami-
nation of legislative motive is sometimes useful. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
However, he concluded that it is a safer policy, where the government may be
"attempt[ing] to squelch opposition," to require absolute neutrality. Id (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 1171 (Brennan, J., concurring).
121. Id. (Brennan,J., concurring)..
122. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). Accord Ely, supra note 90, at 1496
("[r]estrictions on free speech are rarely defended on the ground that the state
simply didn't like what the defendant was saying; reference will generally be
made to some danger beyond the message, such as a danger of riot, unlawful
action or violent overthrow of the government"). Indeed, Justice O'Connor's
opinion appeared to allow such action by the government. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at
1164 (noting that government did "not point to congestion.... visual clutter, or
... security" to justify restriction).
123. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1171 (Brennan,J., concurring).
124. See id. at 1172 (Brennan, J., concurring).
125. Id. (Brennan,J., concurring).
126. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). Even though a regulation may restrict
some speech, that regulation is not necessarily invalid. For a list of several cases
1014 [Vol. 34 p. 995
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Brennan noted that the use of the motivation test was dictum. Nonethe-
less, he concluded that it was "ominous dictum,"' 127 for it supported the
proposition that even a politically content-based regulation might be ac-
cepted as content-neutral. 1
28
III. ANALYSIS
In order to achieve valid regulation of political speech, this Note
submits that a synthesis of the time, place or manner analysis 129 and the
motivation test' 30 is necessary. The ability to achieve such regulation
rests upon the validity of applying the motivation test to political speech,
and subsequently upon the advisability of utilizing motivation to test
political speech restraints.
A. Validity of Motivational Analysis for Political Speech
1. Mosely Concerns
Although strict adherence to Mosely would negate an attempt to
facially regulate political speech,' 3 ' the Court has not felt constrained to
follow the literal command of Mosely. 13 2 In addition, as the Court stated
in American Mini Theatres, "broad statements of principle," such as
Mosely's flat prohibition against any facially content-based regulation,
and commentaries which support this claim, see infra note 173. For a discussion
of whether the Court will countenance restrictions on political speech through
content-based regulations, see infra notes 150-69 and accompanying text.
127. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1173 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan
claimed that the motivation test analysis was dictum because the statute could
have been found to be invalid under either Renton or the traditional Mosely con-
tent-based analysis. Id.
128. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White and Blackmun,
dissented regarding the display clause. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part).
He found that the statute passed the compelling interest test for the reasons
stated by the court of appeals. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part). How-
ever, he agreed with the Court that the congregation clause was constitutional
and that the exception for labor picketing did not violate the equal protection
clause. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part) For a discussion of the court of
appeals' holding regarding the display clause, see supra notes 97-99 and accom-
panying text.
129. For a discussion of the time, place or manner analysis, see supra notes
27-51 and accompanying text.
130. For a discussion of the development of the motivation test, see supra
notes 74-92 and accompanying text. For a discussion ofJustice O'Connor's use
of the motivation test in Boos, see supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text, and
infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
131. In Mosely, the Court purported to ban all regulation which had a basis
in content. Mosely, 408 U.S. at 95-98. For a further discussion of the Mosely
holding and its ramifications, see supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
132. For lists of cases and commentaries which do not adhere to Mosely, see
supra notes 56, 65 & 78. For a discussion of reasons behind this lack of adher-
ence, namely the impracticality of Alosely, see infra notes 134-41 and accompany-
ing text.
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are subject to qualification before they reach their logical extreme. 133
Taken to its logical extreme, Mosely is simply impractical. The mere
physical act of speech is not necessarily protected.' 3 4 Therefore, the
content of the speech must be examined to determine if it deserves first
amendment protection. '
3 5
Moreover, commentators have suggested that a hierarchy of values
exists within first amendment jurisprudence.' 3 6 This hierarchy affords
133. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 65 (Court "learned long ago that
broad statements of principle, no matter how correct in the context in which
they are made, are sometimes qualified by contrary decisions before the absolute
limit of the stated principle is reached"). The Court then found Supreme Court
decisions contrary to Mosely. Id. at 66-70. For a discussion of the Court's find-
ings, see supra note 78.
134. Stephan, supra note 57, at 211 ("Such a claim [would] extend[] defense
of individual autonomy to the point of total solipsism and seems preposterous
on its face.").
135. Id. at 211-12. Professor Stephan uses the example of defamation to
illustrate this point. In such lawsuits the Court must look at the content of the
expression, for speech relating to facts is actionable, while speech relating to
ideas is not. Id. at 212-13 (citing Gertzv. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340
(1974)). The difficulty with AloselY is that to determine if expression is "commu-
nicative" and therefore protected under the first amendment, one must examine
the content of the expression, but Mosely forbids such an examination. See Note,
supra note 65, at 1859.
136. Stephan, supra note 57, at 206. "The approach reflected in the Court's
free speech opinions, and in almost every scholarly discussion of the first
amendment, posits some hierarchy of values entitled to constitutional protec-
tion." Id. The hierarchy "implies a similar ranking of particular categories of
expression, according to the degree the expression implicates the underlying
values" of the first amendment. Id.
A myriad of values has been claimed for the first amendment. Some com-
mentators suggest that protection of political speech is the sole value served by
the amendment. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into
the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). Others suggest
that the first amendment was meant to promote the goals of individual self-ful-
fillment, attainment of truth and ability to participate in decision-making. T.
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-13 (1966);
Karst, supra note 4, at 23-26. Professor Emerson adds that the first amendment
was also designed to facilitate stable change. T. EMERSON, supra, at 13-15.
Another commentator suggests that free speech promotes what is known as
the checking value of the first amendment. Blasi, The Checking V'alue in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521. Professor Blasi claims that, in
the recent past, "the First Amendment has had at least as much impact on Amer-
ican life by facilitating a process by which counterveiling forces check the misuse
of official power as by protecting the dignity of the individual.... promoting the
quest for ... philosophic truth, or fostering a regime of 'self-government.' " Id.
at 527. Professor Blasi cites as examples the effect of the peace protests on de-
escalating the Vietnam War, and the role of the free press in uncovering the
Watergate scandal. Id.
Another suggestion is that the "constitutional guarantee of free speech ulti-
mately serves only one true value, . . . 'individual self-realization.' " Redish, The
'alue ofFree Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982). Professor Redish defines
this term so broadly as to almost preclude the possibility of necessarily finding a
particular type of speech unprotected by the first amendment. Id. He views the
1016 [Vol. 34 p. 995
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different types of speech different levels of protection. The hierarchical
value of a particular type of speech depends upon the degree to which
that expression implicates first amendment values.1 37 A conceivable hi-
erarchy is, in descending order, political speech, intellectual speech and
commercial speech. ' 3 8
Intuitively, if a court could not operate invoking such a hierarchy, a
more restrictive free speech environment would develop. 139 Highly val-
ued speech would receive protection, but speech perceived to be low in
value would simply receive no protection at all. Alternatively, if the low
value speech were protected, without hierarchy that low value speech
would command the same protection as that granted highly valued
speech. In such a situation, courts might well diminish protection of
highly valued speech to avoid having to extend excessive protection to
speech having little first amendment value. Hierarchy offers a more flex-
ible mode of analysis. It permits protection of a broad range of speech
along a continuum, rather than requiring an all or nothing approach.
Though there have been arguments against such a hierarchy, 140 it is
host of first amendment values propounded by other commentators as subsets
of the broad self-realization value. Id. at 594.
Professor Redish discerns self-realization as the greatest value of the first
amendment because "moral norms inherent in the choice of our specific form of
democracy logically imply the broader value, self-realization." Id. He reasons
that "our nation's adoption of a democratic system reveals an implicit belief in
the worth of the individual." Id. at 601. Therefore, contends Professor Redish,
speech is protected not only to serve the political process, but to advance the
self-realization principle inherent in our democratic structure.
137. Stephan, supra note 57, at 210-12. Thus "the independent variable is
the content of the speech, and the dependent variable is the degree of constitu-
tional protection." Id. at 212.
Akin to a hierarchy is "low value" speech. Stone, supra note 4, at 194-95.
Low value speech does little to further the purposes of the first amendment. Id.
at 194. Examples include express incitement, false statements of fact, obscenity,
commercial speech, fighting words and child pornography. Id. at 194-95. Such
speech receives little protection. Id. at 195. But see Kalven, The New York Times
Case: A Vote on "the Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV.
191, 217-18 ("[n]o category of speech is any longer beneath the protection of
the First Amendment"). Although Professor Stone contends that low value
speech is not inconsistent with 11oselY, it does appear at odds with Mosely's total
blindness to content. Stone, supra note 4, at 196 n.27.
138. See Stephan, supra note 57, at 232. This is not to say that the hierarchy
is static, for as societal values change, the hierarchy may change with them.
Scanlon, Freedom of Expression atd Categories of E.xpression, 40 U. Prrr. L. REV. 519,
522-23 (1979). Because Professor Scanlon's hierarchy depends upon a societal
consensus on the relative values of different concerns, when this consensus
shifts, the hierarchy also shifts. Id. at 522. For example, Professor Scanlon as-
serts that as there has been a movement toward viewing religious interests on
the same level as other interests, religious concerns have slipped from the pre-
eminent position they had traditionally held. Id. at 523.
139. Stephan, supra ndte 57, at 213-14. Cf itifa notes 213-14 and accompa-
nying text (use of hierarchy avoids need to overregulate in attempt to assure
regulation affects all speech equally).
140. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 73 n. 1 (Powell,J., concurring); id. at
1989] NOTE 1017
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submitted that the hierarchical scheme is rather firmly entrenched. 141 A
hierarchical analysis necessarily promotes regulation based on content,
for it determines the degree of protection speech should receive by in-
quiring into the content of the speech.
Even beyond the somewhat theoretical claim that a hierarchy exists,
the Court has in fact upheld facially content-based regulations. 14 2
Along with the practical difficulties of Mosely, these decisions support the
claim that the Mosely rule, standing alone, is insufficient to invalidate a
facially politically content-based regulation.
2. Motivational Analysis Generally
There is no direct precedent for analyzing a facially politically con-
tent-based regulation under the motivation test. Under this test, a law is
improperly motivated if it is directed at restricting speech qua speech,
rather than at secondary effects and only incidentally affecting expres-
sion."4 3 Improper government motivation is clearly undesirable. 14 4
86 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (employment of hierarchy leads to protection of only
those values favored by majority); Redish, supra note 136, at 594-95, 625-40 (any
claim that type of speech is per se deserving of less protection violates self-reali-
zation principle that one may attain self-realization on unique individual basis);
Leading Cases, supra note 15, at 199 (permitting differing protection of speech
based on differing values attached to that speech "eviscerates the first amend-
ment by allowing only for protection of speech approved by a majority of the
citizenry"); Comment, When Speech Is Not Speech: A Perspective on Categorization in
First Amendment Adjudication, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 33, 33-37 (1983) (right of
free speech was viewed by framers as natural right, independent of social utility;
speech thus should not be categorized according to such utility).
141. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 70-71 (plurality opinion of Stevens,
J.) ("it is manifest that society's interest in protecting [erotic material] is of a
wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled polit-
ical debate.... [Flew of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to
preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' "); T. EMERSON,
supra note 136, at 3-15 (most important speech is that which advances self-fulfill-
ment, attainment of truth, self-governance and stable change); Stephan, supra
note 57, at 206 ("No sensible approach to first amendment questions can dis-
pense with such a hierarchy."); Note, supra note 65, at 1862 (speech which "pro-
mote[s] the realization of 'man's spiritual nature' " should receive greatest
protection).
142. For a discussion of decisions upholding facially content-based regula-
tions, see supra notes 56, 78 & 135.
143. For a discussion of the development of the motivation rule, see supra
notes 74-92 and accompanying text. On the other hand, a law is not improperly
motivated simply because a legislator may attach some "secret aspiration" to it.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 820 (2d ed. 1988). Professor Tribe
gives as an example a legislator hoping that a tax cut for which he voted will
result in greater contributions to his political party. Id. Moreover, a law is not
improperly motivated simply because a legislator believes its passage will benefit
him personally. Id. Rather, the determination that a law is improperly moti-
vated should be based upon its societal impact. Id.
144. Improper motivation occurs where the government desires to restrict
speech due to its content. According to Professor Stone, this desire is objection-
able for three principal reasons. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content:
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However, there are those who doubt the efficacy of basing first amend-
ment analysis on scrutiny of the government's motives.' 4 5
Despite such doubt, the Court has shown confidence in its ability to
apply such a test, and has been willing to do so. 14 6 Indeed, in several
recent cases the Court has found an investigation into government moti-
vation to be dispositive of the neutrality issue. 14 7 Commentators also
support, albeit under some objection, employment of a motivation
test. 148 It is submitted that it is proper to utilize the government moti-
The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 80, 103-04 (1978).
First, free expression aids the search for truth. Individuals are more likely to
discover this truth if allowed to view all ideas for themselves and decide what is
correct, rather than have the government decide for them. Id. Second, free
speech plays an important role in self-governance. An informed populace is in-
dispensible to that self-governance. Id. at 104. Finally, free expression en-
hances the personal growth of the individual. Any attempt by the government to
control that expression necessarily stunts that growth. Id.
Some believe courts should be more active in policing improper legislative
motivation. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Uncon-
stitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95. Professor Brest argues that
government is constitutionally prohibited from attaining certain discriminatory
objectives. Id. at 116. Yet, to the extent that a decision maker is improperly
motivated, he or she aims to achieve that illicit objective. The more a legislator
is improperly motivated, the greater the chance that he or she will enact a dis-
criminatory law. Id. Generally, an individual adversely affected by a legislative
decision cannot challenge the decision if it was the result of a "fair" decision-
making process. However, where the decision would not have been reached but
for the improper motivation, the individual has legitimate grounds for griev-
ance. Id. If a court finds that a legislator considered an improper objective, the
court should presume that the improper objective was embodied in the law. Id.
at 117. In the absence of strong evidence rebutting this presumption, Professor
Brest states that the court should then invalidate the legislation. Id.
145. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1171-73 (Brennan,J., concurring); Renton, 475 U.S.
at 57-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Redish, supra note 14, at 132 (court will have
difficult time determining true government motivation, and emphasis on motiva-
tion simply informs government that it must provide paper trail of proper
motivation).
146. As Justice O'Connor stated, "our courts are capable of distinguishing
a sham . . . purpose from a sincere one." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court has held that "[r]egulation and
suppression are not the same ... and courts ofjustice can tell the difference."
Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 408 (1953). Moreover, the fact that the
Court has adhered to a motivational test implies that it believes it can properly
administer it.
147. See Boos, 108 S. Ct. 1157; Renton, 475 U.S. 41; Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vin-
cent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50; see also Stone,
supra note 4, at 227 (Court "has tended increasingly to emphasize motivation as
a paramount constitutional concern").
148. See L. TRIBE, supra note 143, at 82 1. Professor Tribe recognized three
major objections to scrutinizing legislative motive: (1) a law may be proper even
if it is the result of improper motivation; (2) it is a waste of time to invalidate a
law which will simply be reenacted sporting a paper trail of purer justifications;
and (3) it is simply too difficult to determine the motivation of a legislative body.
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vation test, thereby permitting a facially content-based regulation to be
analyzed as content-neutral. Use of this test in turn permits the content-
based regulation to be evaluated as a time, place or manner regula-
tion. 149 Still, it is unclear whether the motivation test, and thereby the
time, place or manner test, are applicable to ordinances facially regulat-
ing political speech.
3. Precedent
The Boos Court's use of the motivation test seems to present the
potential for greater governmental regulation of political speech. How-
ever, the Court did not uphold such regulation in that case. 15° If one
Professor Tribe found the first objection to be untenable because a court
will in fact look at the process of enactment and will uphold a law only if that
process is proper. Id. at 821-22.
He countered the second objection by asserting that the mere possibility of
reenactment does not mean that the initial invalidation is useless. First, a court
should not uphold an improper law simply to save time. Such an action is inher-
ently wrong, and would have a demoralizing effect on the faith of the citizenry in
the judiciary. Id. at 822-23. Second, "so undisciplined and disparate an institu-
tion as a legislative body" will not necessarily be able to hide an illegitimate
motive from the courts. Id. at 822.
Finally, while agreeing that discerning legislative purpose may be a difficult
task, Professor Tribe states that it could be simplified. He suggests a standard to
invalidate a law that would require showing that "the legislature was motivated
in substantialparl by an illicit purpose." Id. at 823 (emphasis in original). Thus,
the court need inquire into legislative motive no more so than it does when
construing a statute. Id.
Professor Brest finds an additional argument against motivation analysis to
be the impropriety of a court investigating the motives of legislators and execu-
tive officials. "A finding of illicit motivation often is tantamount to an accusation
that the decisionmaker violated his constitutional oath of office.... IA] judicial
determination of illicit motivation carries an element of insult; it is an attack on
the decisionmaker's honesty." Brest, supra note 144, at 129-30. At the same
time, however, Professor Brest defends motivation analysis by noting that "leg-
islators sometimes do act out of illicit motivations." Id. at 130. Therefore, Pro-
fessor Brest advocates investigation into legislative and administrative motive to
protect both the person adversely affected by an improperly motivated law and
the integrity of the system itself. Id.
The motivation test has been found to be preferable to the traditional ap-
proach of deciding whether a regulation is content-neutral or content-based on
its face. The traditional approach does not deal adequately with regulations
which are based on content, but those which regulate only the time, place or
manner of speech. Note, supra note 73, at 351-55. Nonetheless, some assert
that by making the Court's primary focus neutrality, regulations may be vali-
dated regardless of their disastrous effects on firee speech or the insignificance of
asserted government interests. Gottlieb, The Speech Clause and the Limits of AVeu-
tralitv, 51 Ai.i. L. REV. 19, 34-36 (1986). It is submitted that these fears can be
alleviated by applying the other elements of the time, place or manner test. For
a discussion of these elements, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
149. For the factors considered in evaluating a time, place, or manner regu-
lation, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
150. The Court struck down the regulation of political speech after it found
the regulation to be content-based. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1164-68.
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accepts the idea of a hierarchy of free speech values, political speech is
at or near the top of that hierarchy.151 Yet it is unclear whether this
preeminent position excludes political speech from the motivation
test.' 52 No court has yet used the Renton secondary effects test to up-
hold a facially content-based regulation of political speech.15 3 Nonethe-
less, there are hints that political speech may eventually be subject to
facially content-based regulations.
Prior to Boos, the Court had never applied the secondary effects
analysis to political speech. Moreover, there was strong evidence that
the Court would reject the Renton analysis in that context. 154 Authority
for this proposition came directly from the two cases which developed
the secondary effects analysis. In American Mini Theatres the Court stated
that "it is manifest that society's interest in protecting [erotic and sexu-
ally-oriented material] is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude
than the interest in untrammeled political debate."'155 In Renton the
Court echoed American Mini Theatres, limiting its holding to "businesses
that purvey sexually explicit materials,"' 5" and noting increased con-
cern for "untrammeled political debate."1 5 7
These statements are dicta, for neither American Mini Theatres nor
Renton involved political speech. However, the fact that the Court took
special care to exempt political speech from its newly-developed analysis
151. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1980) (expression of views on
public issues "has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values"); BeVier, supra note 136, at 300-22 ("[first] amendment in
principle protects only political speech"); Bloustein, The Origin, Validitv, and Inter-
relationships of the Political Values Sened By Freedom of Expression, 33 RUTGERS L. REV.
372, 381 (1981) (Declaration of Independence states that governments " '[de-
rive] their just powers from the consent of the governed' " and populace cannot
consent to being governed without being informed about the government);
Bork, supra note 136, at 20-26 ("constitutional protection should be accorded
only to speech that is explicitly political"); Gottlieb, supra note 148, at 32 ("polit-
ical speech ranks as the most sacrosanct of speech protected under the first
amendment"); Kalven, supra note 137, at 204-10 (protection of political speech
is "at the center" of the first amendment, for without that protection democracy
could not operate); Stephan, supra note 57, at 207-09 ("the leading theme in the
Supreme Court's cases is the primacy of political speech").
152. One rationale which militates against restricting speech is that free-
dom of speech promotes political stability by permitting disaffected groups to
"let off steam." See T. EMERSON, supra note 136, at 13. Accord Bloustein, supra
note 151, at 377-78.
153. In fact, the Court developed the secondary effects test in the context
of sexual speech. In those cases the low hierarchical value of the speech was one
factor in applying the test. For a discussion of the Court's treatment of this
issue, see infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
154. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1172 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan
noted that the Renton analysis had not formerly been applied to political speech,
but instead had been limited to situations involving sexual speech. Id. (Brennan,
J., concurring).
155. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 70.
156. Renton, 475 U.S. at 49.
157. Id. at 49 n.2.
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underscores its desire to protect such speech. The heightened respect
accorded political speech kept it beyond the reach of the secondary ef-
fects test.
Nonetheless, there are recent cases in which, although the regula-
tion itself did not uniquely target political speech, the Court utilized the
motivation test where the practical effect of the regulation was to limit
such speech.1 58 Although these cases may presage an eventual endorse-
ment of politically content-based regulation, the dicta in American Mini
Theatres and Renton at least suggests that such regulation is improper. 159
Still, a reexamination of Boos may indicate a shift toward acceptance of
politically content-based regulation.
Precedent supports the invalidation of the display clause, because
the clause regulated speech due to its content. 161 Yet, Justice O'Connor
158. In Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988), the Court upheld an ordi-
nance which banned picketing of private residences. The government claimed
that the purpose of the ordinance was to protect the occupants of the house
from the mental pain and anguish which would accompany such picketing. Id. at
2498. The Court found the ordinance to be content-neutral. Id. at 2500-01.
However, it is submitted that it was content-based to the extent that it prohib-
ited only those demonstrations which cast the occupants of the house in a nega-
tive light. In fact, the ordinance was aimed at the "emotional distress and
disturbance" caused by picketing, and its stated purpose was to permit home-
owners to "enjoy in their homes and dwellings a feeling of well-being, tranquil-
ity and privacy." Id. at 2498 (quoting App. to Juris. Statement A-26). But see id.
at 2508-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (though ordinance will likely not be applied
to friendly or harmless picketing, such picketing falls within statute's sweep).
For example, a crowd of supporters outside a home would not cause the same
mental suffering at which the ordinance was directed. Moreover, even though
the ordinance was not directed at any particular type of speech, it produced a
political effect in Frisby because it stifled the speech of anti-abortion protesters.
Id. at 2498. In upholding the ordinance, the Court placed great stress on the
important governmental interest in protecting the home. Id. at 2502-04. For a
discussion of the substantial governmental interest in residential privacy, see
Arnolds and Seng, Picketing and Privacv: Can I Patrol on the Street Where You Live?,
1982 S. ILL. U.L.J. 463, 474-79.
Both City 'Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent and Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-l'iolence also involved use of the motivation test to uphold ordinances which
had the effect of regulating political speech. Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984). However, both ordinances applied equally to all
speech, and therefore neither was politically facially content-based. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 290-91 (regulations prohibited any camping,
not just camping which carried political message); Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
at 794 ("both political and nonpolitical signs... [were] removed 'without regard
to their content' ").
159. At least prior to Boos the Court had never extended the Renton analysis
to facially politically content-based regulation. For a discussion of this possible
limitation on Renton, see supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
160. The Court has consistently held that a regulation may not restrict
speech simply because the government dislikes the content of that speech. See,
e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (Court struck down
ordinance designed to protect unwitting viewers by prohibiting drive-in theatres
from showing films containing nudity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
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noted that there was no attempt to vindicate the regulation by pointing
to "congestion, to interference with ingress or egress, to visual clutter,
or to the need to protect the security of embassies." 161 The implication
ofJustice O'Connor's statement and her motivation test approach is that
the Court may find regulation of political speech content-neutral as long
as such regulation is motivated by recognized secondary effects
concerns. 1
62
4. The Effect of Boos
The use of the motivation test in a political speech setting, albeit by
only a plurality of the Court, suggests movement toward more regular
use of that test for facially politically content-based regulations. This
implication is perhaps the most significant aspect of Boos. Moreover,
Justice Stevens, who wrote the opinion in American Mini Theatres which
cautioned against application of the motivation test to political
speech, 16 3 joined Justice O'Connor in applying that very test to the
political speech in Boos. 164 As a consequence, the sentiment against us-
ing the motivation test to evaluate political speech regulations may be
diminishing.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, both of whom joined in
American Mini Theatres and Renton in suggesting that secondary effects
analysis was inappropriate for political speech regulation, '" 5 declined to
join Justice O'Connor's opinion extending secondary effects analysis to
political speech. Both Justices instead failed to reach the secondary ef-
fects question because they agreed with the court of appeals that the
statute satisfied the compelling state interest test. I'! Significantly, how-
ever, neither joined Justice Brennan's concurrence which condemned
such an extension of the motivation test. 16 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist's
(1969) (Court struck down statute which made it crime to advocate use of vio-
lence); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (Court struck down
state tax designed to punish newspapers which had opposed state's governor).
161. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1164. These justifications are secondary effects con-
cerns, for the need for regulation is a product of the speech regulated, but is not
aimed at the speech itself. See id. at 1163; Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-49.
162. Justice O'Connor did apply the secondary effects test to the political
speech in Boos. 108 S. Ct. at 1163-64. The Court found the regulation to be
content-based because it was leveled at the direct impact of the speech. Id. at
1164.
163. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 52, 70.
164. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1160.
165. Renton, 475 U.S. at 42; American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 52. In fact,
ChiefJustice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in Renton. 475 U.S. at 43.
166. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1173 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part). Justice
Blackmun joined in this opinion as well. Justice Blackmun concurred in the re-
sult in Renton without indicating his position on the secondary effects test. Ren-
ton, 475 U.S. at 55. He dissented in American Mini Theatres. 427 U.S. at 84, 88.
167. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1173 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan
NOTE 10231989]
29
Dugan: Secondary Effects and Political Speech: Intimations of Broader Go
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
opinion was simply silent on the applicability of the secondary effects
test.
In sum, the Court has not yet used the secondary effects test to hold
that a politically content-based regulation is content-neutral. Nonethe-
less, it is submitted that the groundwork has been laid for such a hold-
ing. In Boos, Justices O'Connor, Stevens and Scalia accepted the
motivation test in a political speech context. 1" ChiefJustice Rehnquist
and Justice White have previously expressed approval of the secondary
effects test.'1 1 Their opinion in Boos leaves unresolved their position on
the political speech question. In the future, they may be willing to apply
Renton to such speech. Finally, it is unknown what stance Justice Ken-
nedy, who took no part in Boos, will take on this issue. Therefore, at
least six Justices have or conceivably could embrace the Renton analysis
for political speech. Given the possibility of an extension of Renton, it is
important to consider whether such an extension is advisable.
B. The Desirability of Motivational Analysis for Political Speech
1. The "Hard Look" Motivation Test
While free speech can be expected to cause a degree of unrest, 170
individuals need not be permitted to engage in utterly unrestrained
speech.171 The Court has recognized and accepted the need for govern-
mental regulation. 7'7 2 The Court has also accepted the fact that such
regulation may incidentally restrict free speech. ' 7-" Thus, it is submitted
that objections to the use of the motivation test to analyze regulation of
political speech cannot properly be based on a desire to leave such
speech untouched. '
74
disagreed with the reasoning of the Court, but still concurred in its judgment
concerning the display clause. Id. at 1171-73.
168. Id. at 1160, 1163-64 (plurality opinion).
169. Renton, 475 U.S. at 42; American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 52, 62-63.
170. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965) ("a 'function of free
speech.., is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are,
or even stirs people to anger.' ") (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-
5 (1949)).
171. Indeed, to so hold would be to permit chaos. For a discussion of the
ability of government to rightfully limit speech, see supra notes 34-36 and ac-
companying text.
172. For a discussion of time, place or manner regulation, see supra notes
27-51 and accompanying text.
173. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294
(1984) ("reasonable time, place, or manner regulations normally have the pur-
pose and direct effect of limiting expression but are nevertheless valid"). Accord
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984). See Redish,
supra note 14, at 128-30 (admitting that content-neutral restrictions serve to
limit free speech, yet have been upheld by Court).
174. It may be, however, that the Court failed to extend the motivation
analysis to political speech because it did not want to restrict such speech. For a
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It has been suggested, instead, that the concern with protecting
political speech over other categories of speech is due not so much to its
societal value as to the inherent distrust of the government's motive for
such regulation. 175 The government is distrusted in the area of political
speech regulation because it is believed to have a greater interest in sup-
pressing criticism of itself than in stifling other types of speech. 17" As a
result, the courts should subject political speech regulations to close
scrutiny not because such speech is necessarily better, but because the
government is to be less trusted in regulating it. This Note proffers a
solution designed to meet this concern. Rather than automatically inval-
idating a content-based regulation of political speech, courts should
look closely at such a regulation to ensure that improper governmental
motivation is not present. If, after such a "hard look" the government's
motivation proves permissible, and the remainder of the time, place or
manner test is met, then the regulation should be upheld.
A "hard look" would involve courts carefully scrutinizing govern-
ment motivation. Such scrutiny is necessary because once the motiva-
tion is deemed proper, the regulation undergoes a lower standard of
review.'177 Therefore, before using this lower standard, a court should
be sure that the government does not seek merely to circumscribe
speech due to its content.
When the government attempts to justify facial political speech re-
strictions on secondary effects grounds, a court should not simply defer
to this justification. It should actively consider whether these secondary
effects concerns exist and whether these concerns were the true catalyst
for the regulation. The burden need not be placed on the government
to prove proper motivation. ' 78 However, once a court finds that a "rea-
sonably well informed observer" would view the governmental action as
designed to suppress speech, a compelling state interest should be re-
quired. 17 1 A court might test a reasonably well informed observer's
opinion by inquiring whether the government would have adopted the
discussion of the Court's failure to extend the Renton analysis, see supra notes
155-57 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the Court has upheld regulations
that have had an incidental though appreciable effect on political speech. See
supra note 158.
175. Scanlon, supra note 138, at 541-42.
176. Id. For example, "the government [is] much less partisan in the com-
petition between commercial firms than in the struggle between . . . political
views." Id. at 541.
177. This lower standard of review is the time, place or manner test. For a
discussion of this standard of review, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
178. But cf Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1037-39 (1979) (suggesting placing burden on govern-
ment to show racial regulation not improperly motivated).
179. See L. TRIBE, supra note 143, at 820. This approach initially provides
the government with the benefit of the doubt by providing a lower standard.
However, it immediately requires a higher standard once that benefit appears
unjustified.
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regulation even if it disadvantaged speech which the government
favored. 1811
The "hard look" test would use a totality of the circumstances ap-
proach. A court should examine both direct and circumstantial evidence
which might shed light on the government's motivation. 18 1 Several
sources for this evidence have been suggested, including the language
of the regulation itself, the foreseeable practical effects of the regulation,
the context or social environment in which the law was passed and the
written legislative history. 182 Equally as important may be what is not in
the legislative history.' 8 3 Thus, if secondary effects concerns are not
discussed in the history, but surface only at trial, the secondary effects
claim may be merely an impromptu attempt to conceal improper ob-
struction of speech. It is submitted that by taking a "hard look" at this
evidence, courts will be sufficiently able to uncover improperly moti-
vated regulations and invalidate them.
2. Motivational Analysis Concerns
a. Deferential review
Some commentators have expressed concern that once a court de-
cides to apply a time, place or manner test, it subjects a regulation to
deferential review, rather than to the close scrutiny which the "hard
look" analysis espouses for political speech regulation. 18 4 Such lower
scrutiny means that a court would be less likely to recognize improper
governmental motivation, simply because the government's justification
would face only minimal review. To avoid this problem, courts must
avoid assuming that the government's motivation is proper. Fortu-
nately, the alleged predisposition of courts to provide only limited re-
view to time, place or manner regulation is a behavioral and not a
doctrinal matter. As such, the courts need not overrule precedent to
subject regulations to a discerning analysis; they need only apply them-
selves to the task of carefully inspecting governmental motivation. If
courts resolve to closely inspect governmental motivation, the fears of
overly deferential review will be largely illusory.
180. See Stone, supra note 4, at 232.
181. See L. TRIBE, supra note 143, at 824-25 (utilizing this approach to con-
clude that law in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1967), which prohib-
ited burning of draft cards should have been subjected to compelling interest
analysis).
182. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE
L.J. 1205, 1220 (1970).
183. See L. TRIBE, supra note 143, at 824.
184. For a general discussion of this lower scrutiny concern, see Gold-
berger,Judicial Scrutiny in Public Forum Cases: Misplaced Trust in theJudgment of Pub-
lic Officials, 32 BUFFALO L. REV. 175 (1983); Lee, supra note 31.
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b. Sham secondary effects justifications
Perhaps an even greater fear with secondary effects analysis is that a
regulation truly designed to suppress the content of speech will be
masked by a secondary effects justification. ' 85 This fear is magnified by
the possibility that a regulation affecting highly valued political speech
may be enacted to achieve illegitimate motives.' 8" Yet, the Court has
countered this concern by expressing confidence in its ability to ferret
out improper motivation. 18 7 Moreover, the fact that the Court adopted
a test in American Mini Theatres and Renton which expressly required it to
inquire into governmental motivation implies that the Court feels com-
fortable in such an exercise.' 8 8
In the end, however, this concern may be well-grounded. Govern-
ment may indeed attempt to suppress unpopular speech, and courts may
not always be able to discern the improper motive. While Justice
O'Connor did invalidate an improper motive in Boos,' 8 'Justice Brennan
claimed that the Court erred in finding Renton's ordinance to be
targeted at secondary effects. v  In addition, the American Mini Theatres
Court has been criticized for accepting Detroit's secondary effects justifi-
cation, an acceptance alleged to have been based upon deference to the
city's contention that such effects existed."' 1 This concern does not
mean that the motivation test is unworkable. However, careful scrutiny
of governmental secondary effects rationalizations is necessary to iden-
185. Renion, 475 U.S. at 57-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I simply cannot
accept ... Renton's claim that the ordinance was not designed to suppress the
content of adult movies"); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
821-24 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("it is too easy for government to enact
restrictions on speech for ... illegitimate reasons and to evade effective judicial
review by asserting that the restriction is aimed at some displeasing aspect of the
speech that is not solely communicative"); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 56
(1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that arrest of demonstrators was
motivated by hostility towards their views); Lee, supra note 31, at 777-78 ("the
regulation of secondary effects that stem from a particular subject matter may
mask the government's attempt to restrict or eliminate communication offensive
to majoritarian tastes"); supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text (discussing
Justice Brennan's concern in Boos that government might simply "concoct" sec-
ondary effects justifications to repress speech); see also Consolidated Edison v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) (Court appears to suggest that
regulation may have stood better chance of survival if Commission had not been
as frank about its motives).
186. For a discussion of this fear, see supra notes 120-26 and accompanying
text.
187. For a discussion of the Court's belief that it can discern and control
improper motivation, see supra note 146 and accompanying text.
188. For a discussion of the use of a motivation test in Ameican Mini Theatres
and Renton, see supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
189. Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1163-64 (regulation designed to protect dignity of
foreign officials invalid because based on content of speech).
190. Renton, 475 U.S. at 57-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (ordinance should
have been found to be based on content of adult movies exhibited).
191. See Lee, supra note 31, at 777.
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tify and invalidate sham justifications. Such scrutiny should help to ex-
pose improper motivation and discourage it in the future.
c. Significance of manner or location to content
Another problem which arises when the government attempts to
regulate secondary effects is that acceptance of such regulation presup-
poses that the speech being regulated can be separated from the time,
place or manner of its expression.'-92 However, the time, place or man-
ner of expression may be inseparable from its message.l13 For example,
the Federal Communications Commission regulated the airing of a mon-
ologue by comedian George Carlin entitled "Filthy Words," which at-
tempted to convey the benign character of certain off-color words by
reciting a string of those words. 19 4 Carlin's use of the words in a hu-
morous setting, to portray their harmlessness, has been found to be
"one of the best examples of form and content, or more accurately
stated, form and message, totally merged." 1' 5
Therefore, even when an ordinance appears to be neutrally regulat-
ing the time, place or manner of speech, it may in fact be improperly
motivated. The legislature may have realized that by such regulation it
could effectively stifle speech by denying it a necessary forum for or
manner of expression. Courts must thus recognize that improper moti-
vation may be cloaked in legislation which appears valid. A close look at
motivation is therefore necessary to aid courts in discovering improper
motivation.
d. Problems associated with disadvantaged groups
A further fear associated with permitting the government to regu-
late political speech is that it may allow the government to effectively bar
underfinanced and minority groups from exercising their free speech
rights.1)" These groups often lack the financial ability to communicate
192. For a discussion of the claim that it is often impossible to separate out
the significance of the time, place or manner of speech from the speech itself,
see Lee, supra note 31, at 776-81.
193. Id. at 801-05.
194. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In Pacifica, the Court
sustained a Commission ruling which prohibited the airing of Carlin's mono-
logue during times when children might be listening. Id.
195. Quadres, The Applicability of Content-Based Time, Place, and Manner Regu-
lations to Offensive Language: The Binger Decade, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 995, 1036-
37 (1981).
196. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (direct-contact
communication, specifically door-to-door distribution of leaflets, "is essential to
the poorly financed causes of little people"). Accord City Council v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 819-20 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Use of [sign
posting as a] medium of communication is particularly valuable . . .because it
entails a relatively small expense."); Lee, supra note 3 1, at 762-67 ("Facilities like
streets are especially important to minority groups; these groups lack the finan-
cial resources to communicate through direct mail or the mass media.").
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via established media. As a result, they must depend upon their ability
to communicate directly on the street. When the government purports
to be controlling secondary effects by regulating the use of these direct
contact forums, it may actually desire to restrict the content of these
disadvantaged groups' speech.19 7 In order to curb these undesirable
consequences, courts should, as with speech which is intertwined with its
time, place or manner of expression,' ,"8 be aware of the possibility of
these motivations. They should be on guard against a legislature which
desires only to curtail speech. Again, a close scrutiny of governmental
purpose should help to achieve this end.
e. Incentives to overregulate
A final concern ancillary to governmental regulation of political
speech is that "[t]he Court makes an important error when it assumes
that forum regulators make rational, balanced decisions in all cases ex-
cept those in which discrimination is evident." '' - According to this
view, deference to speech regulators is misplaced because even when
they harbor no animosity toward the content of speech, regulators have
strong inherent incentives to overregulate speech. Speech has the "po-
tential to generate significant law enforcement problems and high ad-
ministrative expenses" should it become unruly or otherwise disrupt the
community routine.2 11° ° Regulators are often far more sensitive to the
need for regulation of speech than they are for the need to protect it.'-0
197. Professor Lee states that "[i]nexpensive media-such as leaflets, pa-
rades, street demonstrations, and picketing-are simply more important to
poorly financed communicators than to the wealthy." Lee, supra note 31, at 765.
By controlling these means of communication, the government might be able to
censor groups who rely on such methods. "[Ailternative means of communica-
tion, which are always available in theory, are of little value to those who cannot
afford them." Id. at 766.
198. For a discussion of speech whose message is interwoven with its time,
place or manner of delivery, see supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
199. Goldberger, supra note 184, at 206. This misgiving concerning over-
regulation may extend all the way down to the policeman on the street. Lipez,
The Law of Demonstrations: The Demonstrators, the Police, the Courts, 44 DEN. L.J. 499
(1967). In his study of a police civil disobedience unit, Mr. Lipez found that
"[t]he police simply do not like ... demonstrators." Id. at 509. While "fully
aware of the paper rights of these demonstrators," most policemen "regard
[them] as foolish, potentially dangerous, nuisances." Id. In light of the potential
for problems, officers are willing to curtail free speech rights. Id.
200. Goldberger, supra note 184, at 207. If these problems arise, regulators
are subject to strong criticism and perhaps even dismissal from their jobs. Id.
201. Id. at 207-08. The need for regulation is obvious to the regulator. A
monstrous traffic jam or a riot which results from an exercise of free speech has
an immediate and tangible effect on a large number of people. Id. at 207. A
regulator who fails to regulate to avoid these problems faces an angry reaction
from the public and from his or her superiors. Id.
On the other hand, the pressure to protect speech is not as strong. Free
speech has intangible benefits, and therefore its loss does not produce such a
visible impact. Id. at 208. In fact, except for those who are prevented from
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Moreover, this overregulation tends to fall most heavily on speech con-
cerning controversial issues.2 02
To the extent that regulators attempt to restrict speech because it is
controversial, close court attention to governmental motives may force
the government to regulate in a more even-handed manner. In this re-
spect, the motivation test may successfully coopt illegitimate regulation.
Yet a motivation test will not reach general, systematic overregulation,
for that overregulation is not driven by improper motivation. Applica-
tion of the second and third prongs of the time, place or manner test is
then necessary to ensure a regulation which respects the right of free
speech.-o
3
Many of the fears raised above involve the application of the moti-
vation test, 2°14 or time, place or manner regulations, in general. ' 5 If the
Court applies the motivation test to politically content-based regula-
tions, it will find that it has already addressed and accepted the draw-
backs of such an application when it established both time, place or
manner restrictions and secondary effects analysis.2 ° " Because both
time, place or manner regulations and the motivation test have been
held legitimate, it is submitted that the fears associated with them
should not be permitted to undermine the viability of applying the moti-
vation test to political speech.
3. Advantages of the "Hard Look" Test
Some judges and commentators apparently believe that the only
way to protect against improper governmental motivation in situations
involving a facially content-based regulation is to apply the virtually im-
demonstrating, relatively few people may feel or even realize any loss at all. Id.
Moreover, those few who are affected are usually so politically impotent that
they cannot influence a regulator's decisions. Id.
202. Id. at 208-10. Controversial speech often involves strong emotions
and has a greater tendency to result in civil disorder. Therefore, regulators have
a particular incentive to monitor such speech, and to regulate it aggressively
when it arises. Id. at 208-09. Rather than risk the uncontrolled and dangerous
disorder which may result from underregulation, regulators overregulate to pro-
vide a large margin for error. Id. at 210. Those affected by the overregulation
are likely to be a relatively small group with little political clout, while those
"protected" by the overregulation are likely to be unaware or undisturbed by it.
Id. at 208-13.
203. Although this Note focuses on the content-neutrality prong of the
time, place or manner test, the other two prongs are equally as important. For a
statement of the narrowly tailored and alternative avenue prongs of the time,
place or manner test, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
204. For a discussion of the motivation test, see supra notes 71-92 & 143-49
and accompanying text.
205. For a discussion of time, place or manner regulations, see supra notes
27-51 and accompanying text.
206. For a discussion of the legitimacy of the time, place or manner theory,
see supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the legitimacy
of secondary effects analysis, see supra notes 74-90 and accompanying text.
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passable compelling interest test. 20 7 It is submitted that this heavy-
handed approach may yield unsatisfactory consequences. Under this
dogmatic approach the government is simply not given an opportunity
to implement legitimate policies. "[T]he need to guard against the-mere
possibility of improper motivation does not necessarily justify the invali-
dation of all- viewpoint-based [let alone facially content-based] restric-
tions." 20 8 Indeed, "to meet this concern by testing all content-neutral
restrictions under the same stringent standards of review employed to
test content-based restrictions seems more drastic a step than first
amendment principles require.' '2 ° )
At the same time, courts must guard against an abdication of free
speech principles to any and every governmental claim of secondary ef-
fects concerns. The "hard look" approach meets the demands of both
governmental regulation and free speech protection. By accepting the
secondary effects analysis as applicable to political speech, the approach
provides the government with an opportunity to enact facially politically
content-based regulations without requiring a compelling state interest.
On the other hand, the "hard look" approach scrutinizes the govern-
ment's motives to an unprecedented degree. Therefore, the approach
ensures that the regulations are not merely a pretext for suppressing
unwelcome speech.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the Court has not yet allowed facial regulation of political
speech, Boos suggests that the time when the Court will permit such reg-
ulation may not be far off. When the time comes, such regulation
should be analyzed under the "hard look" motivation test. If a regula-
tion is found to be content-neutral under this test, it should then be
examined under the time, place or manner analysis. The Court need
not use the compelling interest test to analyze such a regulation.
Rather, it should initially make a more stringent examination of the reg-
ulation to determine whether it was properly motivated.
207. Renton, 475 U.S. at 62 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (refusing to find ordi-
nance content-neutral under secondary effects analysis and asserting ordinance
should be subjected to compelling interest test); Clark v. Community for Crea-
tive Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 312-15 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (mini-
mal scrutiny provided once Court accepts apparent lack of content
discrimination has led to "unfortunate diminution of First Amendment protec-
tion"); Redish, supra note 14, at 133 ("most effective means of avoiding indirect
suppression of particular viewpoints . . . is closely to scrutinize all content-neu-
tral regulations") (emphasis in original).
208. Stone, supra note 4, at 231 (emphasis in original). As well, Professor
Farber has pointed out that although some content-based restrictions may be
intended to silence certain views, others may be "entirely innocuous." Farber,
supra note 4, at 736. It is submitted that those regulations that do not seek to
"silence certain views" should not be summarily subjected to a compelling inter-
est test.
209. Stone, supra note 144, at 102.
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A scrupulous examination of governmental motivation should be
the centerpiece of any theory which would allow facially content-based
regulations on political speech. Indeed, the proposition that govern-
ment should be permitted to regulate political speech rests upon the
assumption that courts will assiduously engage in close scrutiny of gov-
ernmental motivation.2 10
While it may seem a simplistic solution to merely encourage the
courts to take a "hard look" at politically-based regulation, the Supreme
Court has already stated that under the Renton analysis it can recognize
illicit motivation.2 ' l By employing an even higher level of investigation,
the courts could put a check on improperly motivated regulation while
at the same time freeing government from the need to meet the virtually
impassable compelling interest test.2 1 2
In addition, the government would be permitted to formulate more
precise rules, regulating only that speech which is the cause of legiti-
mately undesirable secondary effects without adversely affecting speech
which is entirely divorced from those effects.' 3 The government may
wish to control secondary effects which emanate from a specific type of
speech, however, in order to keep the regulation content-neutral it
might be forced to prohibit any speech which resembles the regulated
speech.2 14 If the government is instead permitted to use facially con-
tent-based controls to specifically regulate the offending speech, then
unoffending speech need not be subjected to unnecessary restrictions.
While a prohibition of political speech would be anathema to first
amendment values, it is also undeniable that the government has a legit-
imate need to regulate speech.2 15 Recent emphasis on motivational
analysis allows the government that opportunity without unduly threat-
ening constitutional values.2 11" While the full Court has not yet reached
the point of applying motivational analysis to political speech, several
Justices have moved in that direction.2 1 7 Although some political
210. For a discussion of what the "hard look" analysis entails, see supra
notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
211. For an examination of the roots of the Court's confidence in its ability
to ferret out illicit motivation, see supra note 146.
212. For a discussion of the virtually insurmountable barrier which the
compelling interest test poses to governmental regulation, see supra note 14.
213. See Stone, supra note 4, at 197.
214. Id. Professor Stone states that "the Court may [be] invit[ing the] gov-
ernment to 'equalize,' not by permitting more speech, but by adopting even
more 'suppressive' content-neutral restrictions." Id. at 205. Ironically, there-
fore, a regulation which imposes greater restrictions on speech may stand a
greater chance of being constitutional. Id.
215. For a discussion of the government's need to regulate, see supra notes
27-28 and accompanying text.
216. For a discussion of the recent emphasis on motivation analysis, see
supra notes 73-92, 105-11, 158 & 161-62 and accompanying text.
217. In Boos, Justices O'Connor, Stevens and Scalia approved of a motiva-
tional analysis for political speech regulation. 108 S. Ct. at 1160, 1163-64.
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speech may be incidentally affected, a closely applied time, place or
manner test, including the requirements that the regulation be narrowly
tailored to serve a legitimate governmental interest and leave open al-
ternative channels of communication, should considerably lessen that
possibility.2 18 When a closely applied time, place or manner test is com-
bined with an exacting look at governmental motivation, the govern-
ment's recognized need to regulate can be upheld without running
roughshod over first amendment free speech rights.
J. Robert Dugan
ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy may join their brethren
in the future. For a more thorough discussion of the alignment of the Justices,
see supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
218. For a definition of the elements of the time, place or manner test, see
supra note 3 and accompanying text. For examples of the test as put to practical
use, see supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
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